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ACCIDENTAL WIRETAPS: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF FALSE POSITIVES BY ALWAYS-LISTENING
DEVICES FOR PRIVACY LAW & POLICY
LINDSEY BARRETT & ILARIA LICCARDI*
Abstract
Always-listening devices like smart speakers, smartphones, and other
voice-activated technologies create enough privacy problems when working
correctly. But these devices can also misinterpret what they hear, and thus
accidentally record their surroundings without the consent of those they
record, a phenomenon known as a “false positive.” The privacy practices
and preferences of device users add additional complications. A recent
study of individual privacy expectations and usage of voice assistants
depicts how people tend to carefully consider the privacy preferences of
those closest to them when deciding whether to subject them to the risk of
accidental recordings, but often disregard the preferences of others. The
failure of device owners to get consent from those around them is
exacerbated by the accidental recordings, as it means that the companies
collecting the recordings aren’t obtaining the consent to record their
subjects that the Federal Wiretap Act, state wiretapping laws, and consumer
protection laws require. Failure to obtain consent also contravenes the
stringent privacy assurances that these companies generally provide. The
laws governing surreptitious recordings also frequently rely on individual
and societal expectations of privacy, which are warped by the justifiable
resignation to privacy invasions that most people eventually acquire.
The result is a legal regime ill-adapted to always-listening devices, with
companies frequently violating wiretapping and consumer protection laws,
regulators failing to enforce them, and widespread privacy violations.
Ubiquitous, accidental wiretaps in our homes, workplaces, and schools are
just one more example of why consent-centric approaches cannot
sufficiently protect our privacy, and policymakers must learn from those
failures rather than doubling down on a failed model of privacy governance.
* Lindsey Barrett is a Telecommunications Policy Analyst with the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration. Her views expressed here do not
reflect the views or positions of the NTIA. Ilaria Liccardi is a Research Scientist at the
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The authors are deeply grateful to Anne McKenna, participants of the Privacy
Law Scholars’ Conference 2020, Megan Graham, and Paul Ohm.
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I. Introduction
People generally care about their own privacy. They tend to care less
about the privacy of other people, and the rise of always-on, voice-activated
devices has thrown that distinction, and the social problems it creates, into
sharp relief. As always-on devices have become cheaper and more popular,
they’ve faded into the fabric of daily life: people often fail to realize that
their utterances are being recorded by a smartphone, a smart speaker, or a
smart television that might be hidden from sight or right under their noses.
While always-on smart assistants are designed to record only after they
detect a specific “wake word,” they also engage in “passive listening,”
meaning they analyze their surroundings in anticipation of a command to
begin recording, and (purportedly) delete what they recorded until the
command was received. But these devices can incorrectly perceive the
utterance of a wake word, which means they record their surroundings
without the awareness or consent of the people they’ve recorded. That
includes third parties, given that most people don’t tend to begin every
social interaction they have within earshot of their phone or television by
getting the consent of everyone in the vicinity to record anything they might
say. Companies may also use the recordings that occur after keyword
detection to “improve their products,” and whether those improvements
include making privacy-invasive inferences about the data subjects for
advertising purposes or trying to ascertain details about the company’s
competitors is anyone’s guess. Vocally activated, always-on smart
assistants have transformed our devices into innocuous-seeming wiretaps,
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and the owners of those devices, unsuspecting third parties, and existing
privacy laws are ill-equipped to grapple with the ramifications.
To learn more about how people respond to the privacy implications of
always-on devices for themselves and others, one of us conducted a study
on the preferences and expectations of the users of always-on devices. 1
Participants were asked to download a bespoke, always-on assistant to their
smartphone and answered questions about their privacy preferences and
behavior before and after doing so. The study found that while participants
were often sensitive to the privacy preferences and expectations of people
close to them, like romantic partners, they often disregarded the potential
for violations of the privacy of other people they might be recording, such
as co-workers, acquaintances, or health professionals. Participants declined
to inform people with whom they had less intimate relationships that they
were being recorded, even when they reported believing that the
acquaintances would object to the recording.
The potent combination of surreptitious recordings by always-on devices
and the prevalent disregard for colleagues’ and acquaintances’ privacy that
this study reflects has broad implications for privacy law and policy.
Companies’ interception, use, and disclosure of recordings without thirdparty consent likely violates wiretap laws in states with two- or all-party
consent standards.2 These recordings may also violate the Federal Wiretap
Act3 and laws in states with one-party consent standards, as boilerplate
consent to a privacy policy will likely not suffice for recordings of users
that they were unaware of, or the recordings of third parties. Surreptitious
recordings by always-on devices may also violate consumer protection laws
designed to prohibit businesses from lying to their customers or collecting
personal information from children. Recording children under thirteen
without obtaining their parents’ verifiable consent violates the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 4 and the acquisition and use of
these surreptitious recordings despite public claims that the devices only
record when commanded to do so likely violates prohibitions on unfair and

1. Ilaria Liccardi & Jose Juan Dominguez Veiga, Wiretapping Your Friends: Privacy
Implications of Voice Activated Assistants (Aug. 2019) (unpublished technical report) (on
file with authors). As of January 2022, this study is under review for future publication.
2. See infra Part V.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (requiring parental consent to record children).
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deceptive acts and practices in both state and federal law. 5 Enforcement of
these laws by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state attorneys general,
and in the case of wiretap laws, private plaintiffs, could mean damaging
liability claims for companies selling these devices, and in the case of the
Wiretap Act and state wiretapping statutes, possible criminal liability.
The disparity among how existing privacy laws conceptualize human
behavior, how always-on devices actually function, and how people
actually act has clear implications for existing privacy laws and the
companies violating them. That disparity also has significant implications
for future privacy laws. The unwillingness or inability of device users to
obtain consent from the people they’re recording serves as an umpteenth
example of why consent is a failed method of privacy governance when
relied on as the primary bulwark against privacy violations. 6 And the
“Wiretapping Your Friends” study’s illustration of some participants’
resignation to privacy invasions underscores the significant limitations of
relying on privacy expectations as a factor in determining privacy
protections. Finally, the uneven array of state wiretap standards
demonstrates the value of a strong federal privacy law that takes all of these
considerations into account, and until and unless such a law is politically
feasible, strong state legislation that pushes the threshold that companies
will gravitate around even without a federal mandate.
Ubiquitous, surreptitious recording devices present an unusually stark
problem for privacy law, but the problems they raise are far from unique.
Privacy is a collective value, 7 and reliance on individual decision-making to
protect either individuals or communities is a doomed proposition that will
never provide meaningful privacy safeguards. A legal regime that assumes
a person’s capacity and willingness to obtain meaningful consent from
everyone they might accidentally record ignores reality in favor of tidy
abstractions, a preference that—given the laxity of most privacy laws and
their underenforcement—redounds to the benefit of extractive companies.
The United States needs privacy laws that repudiate a discredited model of
5. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (granting the Federal Trade Commission
authority to define an unfair or deceptive act or practice).
6. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1894–95 (2013) (discussing the inadequacy of consent
in data collection); see infra Section III.C.
7. See generally Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Privacy Dependencies, 95 WASH. L.
REV. 555 (2020) (discussing the interdependency of privacy based on other people’s
decisions and disclosures).
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human behavior that currently leaves people vulnerable to privacy
violations, not laws that use that model as a foundation. The prevalence of
wiretapping consumer devices and how people respond to them despite
what existing law expects is simply one more example of the disparity
between what consent-centric privacy laws envision, and how people
actually live their lives.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of always-listening devices
and the privacy implications of both their function and malfunction through
false positives. Part III outlines the relevant legal standards that the
collection and use of false positives appears to violate—the Federal Wiretap
Act, state wiretap statutes, state and federal unfair and deceptive trade
practice statutes, and COPPA—then critiques their outsized reliance on
consent and privacy expectations. Part IV describes the study of device
users’ privacy considerations regarding false positives and passive listening
by voice-activated assistants. Part V explains how device companies likely
violate wiretapping and consumer protection laws through their collection
and use of recordings prompted by false positives. Part VI considers how
regulators and legislators should respond to the disparity between existing
law’s vision of privacy practices and how people and companies actually
use these devices, and Part VII concludes.
II. Always-On Devices, Privacy, and False Positives
Voice-activated technologies have become tremendously popular in the
past five years or so, from smart assistants incorporated into smartphone or
computer operating systems, to stand-alone smart speakers and voiceactivated capabilities incorporated into various sensor-enabled devices,
such as smart watches,8 connected televisions,9 gaming consoles,10 voiceassistant-enabled locks,11 voice-activated toys, 12 and smart thermostats.13 A
8. Matthew Woodall, My New Apple Watch Is a Privacy Nightmare, MEDIUM: THE
STARTUP (Dec. 4, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/my-new-apple-watch-is-a-privacynightmare-fcf6c84662c5.
9. James K. Willcox, How to Turn Off Smart TV Snooping Features, CONSUMER REPS.
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-to-turn-off-smart-tvsnooping-features/.
10. Joseph Cox, Microsoft Contractors Listened to Xbox Owners in Their Homes, VICE
(Aug. 21, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/43kv4q/microsoft-humancontractors-listened-to-xbox-owners-homes-kinect-cortana.
11. Search for “Yale Assure SL,” YALE, https://shopyalehome.com/products/yaleassure-lock-sl?variant=28400472588388 (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
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Pew Research Center study found that one quarter of American adults
describe having a smart speaker in their home, 14 while a more recent study
by National Public Radio and Edison Research reported increased usage of
voice assistants on smart speakers and other devices during the COVID-19
pandemic, with more than half of device users keeping the assistant enabled
at all times. 15 Mobile device users increasingly rely on voice assistants for
search functions,16 and sinking hardware costs, increased consumer
comfort, and other structural factors make it likely that that growth will
continue. The ease of using a vocal command rather than a visual interface
can be compelling, and it can be transformative for the elderly17 and for
people with disabilities who struggle to use other modalities due to vision,
motor, or other difficulties. 18
At the same time, always-on systems create meaningful privacy
concerns. An always-listening robot that records your every interaction with
it continues to strike many people as creepy and invasive. 19 These privacy
concerns are entirely justified, given the intimacy of the data that can be

12. Moustafa Mahmoud et al., Towards a Comprehensive Analytical Framework for
Smart Toy Privacy Practices, in STAST, PROCEEDINGS: 7TH WORKSHOP ON SOCIOTECHNICAL ASPECTS IN SECURITY AND TRUST 64 (2018), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/
3167996.3168002 (registration required).
13. Control Google Nest or Home Devices by Voice, GOOGLE NEST HELP,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/7207759?hl=en#:~:text=You%20can%20use
%20your%20voice,Filters%20or%20Do%20not%20disturb (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
14. Brooke Auxier, 5 Things to Know About Americans and Their Smart Speakers, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/21/5-things-toknow-about-americans-and-their-smart-speakers/.
15. The Smart Audio Report, NPR & EDISON RSCH. (Apr. 2020), https://www.national
publicmedia.com/uploads/2020/04/The-Smart-Audio-Report_Spring-2020.pdf.
16. Deyan Georgiev, 2020’s Voice Search Statistics – Is Voice Search Growing?, REV.
42 (July 22, 2021), https://review42.com/voice-search-stats/.
17. Kathryn M. Daniel et al., Emerging Technologies to Enhance the Safety of Older
People in Their Homes, 30 GERIATRIC NURSING 384, 387 (2009) (describing assistive
technologies available to help the elderly conserve energy).
18. Yusuf Uzunay & Kemal Bicakci, SHA: A Secure Voice Activated Smart Home for
Quadriplegia Patients, in IEEE COMPUT. SOC’Y, PROCEEDINGS: 2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BIOINFORMATICS AND BIOMEDICINE 151 (2007), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/4425413 (registration required); Fabio Masina et al., Investigating the
Accessibility of Voice Assistants with Impaired Users: Mixed Methods Study, 22 J. MED.
INTERNET RSCH. e18431 (2020).
19. The Smart Audio Report, supra note 15, at 20–23; Auxier, supra note 14.
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captured and the circumstances in which it might be captured. 20 Smart
speakers implicate similar privacy concerns as a search engine operator
with visibility into a person’s search history, or an internet service provider
that can monitor a person’s web browsing, turbocharged by the intimacy
and comfort that an easily accessible, anthropomorphized voice assistant is
intended to create.21 Beyond the sensitivity of a person’s search queries and
range of personal details a voice assistant can have access to, 22 voice data as
a category can also be tremendously revealing about a person. Researchers
have reportedly devised methods of inferring ethnicity, gender, personality,
and physical strength from voice data.23 Even when these methods are
unreliable, a belief in the ability to accurately infer sensitive characteristics
about people from vocal attributes will lead companies to characterize them
accordingly. People also tend to consider audio recordings to be a sensitive
category of information, 24 meaning that abuse of that information could feel
particularly violative.
Always-listening devices can enable the abuse of harmful power
dynamics. Amazon’s Echo offers a “Drop In” feature,25 which allows one
Echo user to connect to another device so long as the other user provided
consent in advance. But there’s no guarantee that consent would be
meaningful or obtained without coercion, and the Drop In feature could
allow an abusive partner, parent, or similar figure to subject their target to
the perpetual concern of aural surveillance. Amazon offers an Alexa service

20. See, e.g., Alex Hern, Apple Contractors ‘Regularly Hear Confidential Details’ on
Siri Recordings, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2019, 12:34 EDT), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-sirirecordings (reporting incidents in which Siri recorded personal medical details, couples
having sex, and seemingly criminal business deals).
21. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 790 (2015)
(citing the consumer protection challenge of regulating a robot that feels like a “social actor”
to human beings).
22. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our
Economy, Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1279–86 (2017).
23. Liccardi & Dominguez Veiga, supra note 1.
24. Nathan Malkin et al., Privacy Attitudes of Smart Speaker Users, PROC. ON PRIV.
ENHANCING TECHS., Oct. 2019, at 250, 250, https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/popets2019-0068.
25. Alexa Communications, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b?node=16713667011
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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for landlords 26 and hospitals, 27 both areas in which occupants may face
limited choice in their ability to physically vacate the space or avoid being
recorded by a device without doing so. Some teachers28 and librarians29 are
using Alexa devices in schools, which presents similar concerns, as well as
possible chilling effects for intellectual privacy. 30 Smartphones with voiceactivated assistants, such as Apple’s Siri or Samsung’s Bixby, are even
more difficult, if not functionally impossible, to avoid than smart speakers
are, given the acceptance of ubiquitous smartphones in a wide range of
social and professional contexts, and their relatively small and easily
concealed design.31 Voice-activated versions of typical objects like
lightbulbs and plugs may also inculcate a mistaken sense of safety and
prevent people from effectively assessing the risks they pose. 32 Moreover,
whatever your Google Home might record is accessible to law enforcement
via a warrant or subpoena, providing yet another avenue through which
data-collecting technologies can enable governmental surveillance. 33

26. Edward Ongweso Jr., Amazon Wants Alexa to Move into Your Apartment Before
You Do, VICE (Sept. 4, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/qj45kx/amazonwants-alexa-to-move-into-your-apartment-before-you-do.
27. Melanie Ehrenkranz, ‘Alexa, Find Me a Doctor.’ ‘Okay, Finding You a Daughter.’,
GIZMODO (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://gizmodo.com/alexa-find-me-a-doctor-okayfinding-you-a-daughter-1833806971.
28. Benjamin Herold, Teacher’s Aide or Surveillance Nightmare? Alexa Hits the
Classroom, EDUC. WEEK (June 26, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/technology/teachersaide-or-surveillance-nightmare-alexa-hits-the-classroom/2018/06; Alexa in Education,
AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/education/alexa-edu/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
29. Miriam E. Sweeney & Emma Davis, Alexa, Are You Listening: An Exploration of
Smart Voice Assistant Use and Privacy in Libraries, INFO. TECH. & LIBRS., Dec. 2020, at 1
(vol. 39, no. 4), https://ejournals.bc.edu/index.php/ital/article/view/12363/10229.
30. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 419 (2008).
31. See generally Matt Novak, The FBI Can Neither Confirm nor Deny Wiretapping
Your Amazon Echo, GIZMODO (May 11, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://paleofuture.gizmodo.com/
the-fbi-can-neither-confirm-nor-deny-wiretapping-your-a-1776092971 (voicing concerns
that “people would willingly put microphones in their own homes” through their use of
smartphones and unobtrusive “always-listening” devices).
32. Malkin et al., supra note 24, at 251.
33. See Sidney Fussell, Meet the Star Witness: Your Smart Speaker, WIRED (Aug. 23,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/star-witness-your-smart-speaker/; see also
Amazon Drops Privacy Rights Fight in Arkansas Murder Case, Hands Over Amazon ‘Echo’
Data, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 6, 2017, 7:17 PM), https://cbs4indy.com/news/nationalworld/amazon-drops-privacy-rights-fight-in-arkansas-murder-case-hands-over-amazonecho-data/ (discussing the admission of Amazon Echo recordings in a murder trial).
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In the case of smart speakers and other voice-activated devices,
integrating an internet-connected device into private spaces—or public
spaces that people face limited choice in frequenting, such as a hospital or a
school—also introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can put people in
danger of privacy violations and other harms. Researchers have
demonstrated how smart speakers can be manipulated into tricking their
owners into divulging personal information, including their passwords,
making them vulnerable to financial loss, dignitary or physical harms, and
the anxiety of having their most intimate personal details revealed. 34
To understand the privacy and associated legal problems with alwayslistening devices, it’s helpful to understand the precise mechanics of how
they work. Amazon’s Alexa perpetually records its surroundings and
analyzes those recordings for its programmed wake word (“Alexa,”
“Computer,” or something else). 35 When it detects the wake word, it sends
that recording to the Amazon cloud, at which point the cloud saves the
recording, interprets what was recorded, and directs the Alexa device to
execute the command it detected, such as reporting the day’s weather,
operating an Alexa “skill,” or providing another service.36 The recordings
on the Alexa device are encrypted when they’re sent to Amazon. 37 It’s
unclear how much computation actually occurs on Google’s voice-activated
devices, as opposed to Google’s cloud: Google devices continually record
snippets of audio and send them to the cloud, but investigative reporting
and individual users examining the logs of what their devices recorded have
revealed that the devices appear to send much longer recordings to Google
than the company claims.38 Apple claims that its HomePod and other voiceactivated devices only send audio to the cloud once the local device has
detected the wake word, and the audio is encrypted and not associated with

34. Victoria Song, Your Google Home and Alexa Can Be Used to Eavesdrop and Phish
for Your Passwords, GIZMODO (Oct. 21, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://gizmodo.com/yourgoogle-home-and-alexa-can-be-used-to-eavesdrop-and-1839223529.
35. Common Questions About Alexa Privacy, AMAZON, https://perma.cc/9Q85-VSZM
(last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
36. Id.
37. Alexa and Echo Devices Are Designed to Protect Your Privacy, AMAZON,
https://perma.cc/T8UM-DS7B (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
38. Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 29, In re Google Assistant
Privacy Litigation, No. 5:19-cv-04286-BLF (N.D. Cal. filed July 25, 2019).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

88

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:79

the user’s identity, but the company’s policy on the snippets of audio
recorded before (and in anticipation of) the wake word is unclear.39
Many of these companies have more privacy-protective policies when it
comes to voice-activated devices than they used to. In 2019, reporting by a
number of news outlets revealed that companies like Microsoft, Apple,
Amazon, and Google were also using human contractors to transcribe,
correct, and annotate recordings from their voice-activated devices, without
disclosing that fact to device owners. The Guardian reported that Apple
contractors “regularly hear[d] confidential medical information, drug deals,
and recordings of couples having sex” as well as “business deals [and]
seemingly criminal dealings,” accompanied by location data, contact
information, and information about app usage, despite Apple’s claims that
the recordings were anonymized 40 and its claims that recordings aren’t sent
to the company at all. Google also employs human contractors to review
voice recordings, and a Belgian news outlet was able to identify people
from their recordings and locations thanks to a dataset provided by a
whistleblower.41 While the company also claimed that the recordings were
anonymized before being provided to contractors, the Belgian outlet was
able to identify people from them, including one recording that contained a
person’s address, and others that captured people discussing their children
and romantic lives. 42 Amazon also used, and continues to use, human
workers to transcribe recordings, and two employees told Bloomberg that
they heard what they believed to be a sexual assault on one recording; 43 on
39. HomePod Overview, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/homepod-2018/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2021) (“After HomePod recognizes the words ‘Hey Siri,’ what you say is encrypted
and sent anonymously to Apple servers without being tied to your Apple ID.”) (screenshot
on file with authors). Apple does not appear to directly address what happens to those audio
recordings in its privacy policies and statements about Siri-enabled devices. Ask Siri,
Dictation & Privacy, APPLE (Dec. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/837Q-3MAV; Apple Privacy
Policy, APPLE (Dec. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/H7GR-73Q4.
40. Hern, supra note 20.
41. Kari Paul, Google Workers Can Listen to What People Say to Its AI Home Devices,
GUARDIAN (July 11, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/11/
google-home-assistant-listen-recordings-users-privacy; see also Blake Montgomery, Apple
and Google Workers Stop Listening to What You Ask Your Voice Assistant, For Now, DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 2, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/apple-and-google-pausehuman-voice-recording-review-over-privacy-concerns.
42. Paul, supra note 41.
43. Alex Hern, Amazon Staff Listen to Customers’ Alexa Recordings, Report Says,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2019, 7:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/
11/amazon-staff-listen-to-customers-alexa-recordings-report-says.
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other occasions, employees shared recordings they found to be amusing in
an employee chatroom. 44
Apple and Google paused their use of human reviewers for recordings
shortly after the 2019 revelations. But the companies resumed a few months
later, adding additional disclosures in their privacy policies.45 Google also
subsequently introduced a “Guest Mode” setting for its smart speaker,
which tells the device to delete audio recordings and descriptions of how
the subject interacts with the device instead of saving them. 46 When
someone using Guest Mode uses services other than Google Assistant (such
as another Google product or a service owned by another company), the
information associated with that interaction is not necessarily treated any
differently than if the device were operating normally.47 Apple also now
deletes recordings by default unless the user opts in, 48 and so does
Microsoft,49 while Amazon appears to still keep recordings and associated
data until the user deletes them. 50

44. Nicole Nguyen, A Team at Amazon Is Listening to Recordings Captured by Alexa,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019, 8:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
nicolenguyen/amazon-employees-listening-to-alexa-echo-recordings.
45. Mae Anderson, Apple Resumes Human Reviews of Siri Audio with iPhone Update,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 29, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/078755dbec364b71a7b34
abf63fb6284.
46. Control Your Privacy on Your Shared Devices with Guest Mode, GOOGLE
ASSISTANT HELP, https://support.google.com/assistant/answer/10217706?p=guestmode&
visit_id=637468437516938656-4231995297&rd=1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
47. Sara Morrison, Google Assistant’s New Guest Mode Is More Private, but There’s a
Trade-off, VOX (Jan. 13, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22229008/googleassistant-guest-mode.
48. Chaim Gartenberg, Apple Apologizes for Siri Audio Recordings, Announces Privacy
Changes Going Forward, VERGE (Aug. 28, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/8/28/20836760/apple-apology-siri-audio-recordings-privacy-changes-contractors.
49. Daphne Leprince-Ringuet, Still Talking to Cortana? Microsoft Gives You More
Control over How Your Voice Recordings Are Used, ZDNET (Jan. 18, 2021, 3:35 PM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/still-talking-to-cortana-microsoft-gives-you-more-controlover-how-your-voice-recordings-are-used/.
50. Amazon has not announced changes to this policy since the company’s response to
Senator Coons, and more recent documentation of its policies, such as a white paper
explaining the company’s Alexa data collection and retention policies published in
December 2019, do not contradict it. Alexa Confidentiality and Data Handling Overview,
AMAZON (Dec. 20, 2019), https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/White%20PaperAlexa%20Confidentiality%20and%20Data%20Handling%20Overview%20Dec%202019.pd
f; see also Makena Kelly & Nick Statt, Amazon Confirms It Holds On to Alexa Data Even if
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These changes are generally an improvement, even if belated and
compelled by undesired scrutiny and public pressure. Automatic deletion is
valuable, given the heavy impact of default settings on user behavior.51 But
for companies that don’t delete recordings automatically, most have given
few clear assurances about how the recordings will be used, 52 and the
exhaustively documented struggles that people encounter in attempting to
protect their privacy through data collection controls will heavily limit the
privacy-protective effects of those changes. 53
Always-listening devices present plenty of privacy risks when working
correctly, but their potential for error creates an additional and worrisome
vector of potential privacy harms. The sounds that constitute “OK Google”
or “Alexa” can be sufficiently similar to other words, allowing always-on
devices to mistakenly start recording without the knowledge of the people
being recorded. For example, an Oregon family’s Alexa recorded their
conversation and accidentally sent it to someone in their contact list, an
employee of one of the family members.54 One study documents how
popular Netflix shows set off various smart speakers, 55 while other
You Delete Audio Files, VERGE (Jul. 3, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/7/3/20681423/amazon-alexa-echo-chris-coons-data-transcripts-recording-privacy.
51. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of
Information, 347 SCI. 509, 512 (2015) (describing the impact of default settings on privacy
choices).
52. See, e.g., FAQs on Privacy: Google Nest, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
googlenest/answer/9415830 (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (“Your device interactions via the
Google Assistant or other Google services (such as YouTube) may be used to personalize
your Google experiences, including to show you relevant ads. For example, the text of your
voice interactions with the Google Assistant can inform your interests for ad
personalization.”). Discarding the recording itself doesn’t address the privacy implications of
extracting the substance of what was said on the recording, in addition to the revelatory
possibilities of metadata and Google’s characterizations of the recording (such as inferred
intent).
53. See infra Section III.C.
54. Hamza Shaban, An Amazon Echo Recorded a Family’s Conversation, Then Sent It
to a Random Person in Their Contacts, Report Says, WASH. POST (May 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/24/an-amazon-echorecorded-a-familys-conversation-then-sent-it-to-a-random-person-in-their-contacts-reportsays/.
55. Daniel J. Dubois et al., When Speakers Are All Ears: Characterizing Misactivations
of IoT Smart Speakers, PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS., Oct. 2020, at 255, 255,
https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/popets-2020-0072 (“After playing two rounds of 134
hours of content from 12 TV shows near popular smart speakers in both the US and in the
UK, we observed cases of 0.95 misactivations per hour, or 1.43 times for every 10,000
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researchers have documented Amazon’s Alexa alerting to “unacceptable”
and “election,” Google Home alerting to “Ok, cool,” Siri to “a city,” and
Cortana to “Montana,” among other confusions. 56 What’s more, these
devices may not always be limited to recording solely in response to verbal
commands, creating an even wider universe for potential mistakes and
privacy violations. Google recently admitted to accidentally turning on an
unannounced new feature for certain Google Home users that involved reprogramming the device to alert to certain non-verbal cues, such as a smoke
alarm or broken glass.57 “Alexa Guard” —Amazon’s home security feature
for always-on devices—already listens for smoke alarms, carbon monoxide
alarms, and the sound of breaking glass,58 and Amazon has filed a patent for
an always-recording voice assistant software that doesn’t rely on a wake
word at all.59 Alexa’s “Follow-Up” mode, which currently allows the
device to complete user requests without repeating the wake word, seems to
anticipate that potential shift.60 False positives resulting from misperceived
verbal commands are just the beginning.
False positives by always-listening software have clear privacy
implications for the people who knowingly use it through a smartphone,
smart speaker, or another connected device. The decision to purchase a
smart phone or speaker cannot be equated with the knowing acceptance of
the potential to be recorded at any moment, with that recording being
words spoken, with some devices having 10% of their misactivation durations lasting at least
10 seconds.”).
56. Lea Schönherr et al., Exploring Accidental Triggers of Smart Speakers,
UNACCEPTABLE, https://unacceptable-privacy.github.io/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
57. Janko Roettgers, Google’s Secret Home Security Superpower: Your Smart Speaker
with Its Always-On Mics, PROTOCOL (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/googlesmart-speaker-alarm-adt.
58. Using Alexa Guard with Alarm to Detect Broken Glass, Smoke, and Carbon
Monoxide, RING, https://support.ring.com/hc/en-us/articles/360028205592-Using-AlexaGuard-with-Alarm-to-Detect-Broken-Glass-Smoke-and-Carbon-Monoxide (last visited Feb.
1, 2021).
59. Jennings Brown, Amazon Patent Reveals Its Vision for an Alexa Device That
Records Every Word You Speak, GIZMODO (May 24, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://gizmodo.
com/amazon-patent-reveals-its-vision-for-an-alexa-device-th-1835004420 (“But under the
technology laid out in the patent, when Alexa detects a wakeword, it will then ‘look
backward’ to find if a command was made before, and use speech pauses to find the start of
the command. It would be able to do this because it would be recording constantly, and
supposedly deleting what it doesn’t need.”).
60. Turn on Follow-Up Mode, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=202201630 (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
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analyzed by human beings and used to target the speaker for products and
services. But this problem is even more concerning when it comes to
accidentally recorded bystanders, who generally have even less reason to
suspect that they’ve been secretly recorded, as they might not have a reason
to be aware of the recording device and are dependent on the device’s
owner to monitor the device for potential erroneous recordings. Expecting
device owners to protect themselves from encroachments on their privacy is
unreasonable enough. But it’s even more unreasonable to expect people to
protect themselves from always-on devices they aren’t aware of. Nor can
we place the privacy protections of bystanders solely at the feet of deviceowners, as though requiring guests to sign a release before they enter your
home or warning everyone you speak to of the potential for recording
would be feasible or effective. Applicable privacy laws are poorly suited to
that reality, as the next section discusses, and the privacy practices of
device owners will continue to leave most of the other people recorded by
these devices vulnerable, as Part IV describes in conjunction with
“Wiretapping Your Friends.”
III. The Legal Landscape
The United States has plenty of federal privacy laws—they simply
haven’t been very effective at preventing or deterring privacy violations.
Always-on devices shine a particularly harsh light on problems with these
laws that privacy advocates and scholars have criticized for decades:
namely the misguided conception of consent as the primary guardrail for
privacy rights, and the failure to recognize how hinging privacy protections
on privacy expectations can dilute those protections thanks to resignation
inculcated by frequent and unavoidable privacy invasions.61 The following
section discusses the existing wiretapping laws and consumer privacy laws
that are most relevant to always-on devices.
A. State and Federal Wiretapping Laws
Federal and state wiretap laws were designed to strictly limit exactly the
kinds of privacy invasions that always-on devices enable: surreptitious
61. Solove, supra note 6, 1880–81; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1464 (2019) (arguing that while
consent should not be wholly rejected as a privacy safeguard, “we have relied upon it too
much, and deployed it in ways and in contexts to do more harm than good, and in ways that
have masked the effects of largely unchecked (and sometimes unconscionable) power”).
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recordings of conversations. The Federal Wiretap Act and wiretap laws in
every state but Vermont 62 govern the intentional interception, disclosure,
and use of the contents of wire, oral, and electronic communications,
though some states use wording that differs slightly from the Wiretap Act’s
phrasing, such as “private” or “confidential” communications. 63 State
legislatures recognized the threat to privacy that wiretapping presented as
early as the 1860s, with states like California, New York, and Illinois
passing prohibitions on telegraph and telephone wiretapping, and with a
steady stream of other states following in their wake over the next seventyodd years.64 By 1967, thirty-six states had banned wiretapping outright,
with twenty-seven allowing a judicially authorized law-enforcement
exception. 65 Congress passed the Wiretap Act in the wake of several
Supreme Court cases that oscillated on the constitutional implications of
wiretapping, with the Court finally and famously concluding in Katz v.
United States that as “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”
warrantless wiretapping by the government was unconstitutional. 66 The law
was intended to limit the privacy invasions that wiretapping enables while
allowing law enforcement to continue to rely on it in a carefully limited,
constitutionally permissible manner, as outlined by the Court in Berger v.
New York and Katz.67 Congress updated the law’s protections for wire and
oral communications to include electronic communications in 1986, and
made additional tweaks to the law in 1994 and 2001.68
The Wiretap Act identifies three categories of communications for
protection—wire communications, oral communications, and electronic
62. Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone
Conversations, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 150 (2009).
63. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 2:29 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2019).
64. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV 801, 841 (2004).
65. Id. at 846 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 48–49 (1967)).
66. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 47–49; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
67. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2163
(“Working from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveillance legislation
should include the above constitutional standards, the subcommittee has used the Berger and
Katz decisions as a guide in drafting title III.”); Carol M. Bast, What's Bugging You?:
Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837,
842 (1998).
68. Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
373, 384–85 (2014); Bast, supra note 67, at 842.
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communications69—which can essentially be understood as telephone
conversations, surreptitiously recorded oral conversations, and digital
communications that exclude voice recordings. It prohibits the intentional
interception, disclosure, or use of the contents of wire, oral, and electronic
communications unless the interceptor is a party to the communications, the
interceptor obtains consent from one of the parties, or an exception
applies.70 The statute is enforceable both by federal prosecutors and private
plaintiffs,71 whom the statute authorizes to obtain “statutory damages of
whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or
$10,000”; if greater, actual damages; punitive damages, when appropriate;
and attorney’s fees. 72 While the hassle and expense of suit will deter the
vast majority of potential plaintiffs, and others may be kept out of court on
civil claims by arbitration clauses 73 and other procedural hurdles, damages
and attorney’s fees are nevertheless potentially meaningful teeth.
The District of Columbia and every state but Vermont have their own
counterparts to the federal statute, all of which make wiretapping a criminal
offense and thirty-five of which provide a civil action for private
plaintiffs.74 Thirty-eight of these laws mirror the Wiretap Act by requiring
only one party to consent to a recording. Twelve states 75 require all parties
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)–(2).
70. Id. § 2511.
71. Id. § 2520.
72. Id.
73. In a recent example, an ongoing class action suit in the Ninth Circuit concerning
allegations that Amazon violated the Wiretap Act by surreptitiously recording people with
its Alexa devices currently depends on whether or not the plaintiffs be compelled to
arbitrate, rather than litigate, their claims, despite the fact that the consent to arbitration was
provided by the device owner only, in the form of accepting a boilerplate terms of service
contract during the device activation process. Brief for Public Justice, P.C. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, B.F. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-35359 (9th Cir. 2020).
74. Hannah Clarisse, Note, Wiretapping in a Wireless World: Enacting a Vermont
Wiretap Statute to Protect Privacy Against Modern Technology, 43 VT. L. REV. 369, 379
(2018).
75. These states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. REPS. COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, REPORTER’S RECORDING GUIDE 1, 2 (2012), https://www.rcfp.
org/wp-content/uploads/imported/RECORDING.pdf [hereinafter REPORTER’S RECORDING
GUIDE]. The Michigan Supreme Court has yet to resolve the open question of whether all
parties must consent to one of the parties recording a private conversation. Reporter’s
Recording Guide: Michigan, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 2020),
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/michigan.
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to consent to the interception of oral and wire communications under most
circumstances, such that the device owner alone providing consent to the
interception, disclosure, or use of a recording without the consent of her
conversational partner would be insufficient. These states have taken a
range of approaches in defining when consent is required, such as whether
the conversation was “secret.”76 California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nevada, and Washington require that all parties consent to secret
recordings.77 These states have defined secrecy in a range of ways, 78 and
some provide examples of how it might be overcome, such as with an
audible beep at specific intervals (Connecticut 79) or an announcement made
in a “reasonably effective manner” at the beginning of the recording
(Washington80).
Other states define protected circumstances through the lens of when
recording subjects have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Maryland and
Illinois require that all parties consent to the recording in situations where
the parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications.81 Pennsylvania law requires that all parties consent to
recording, except in situations where there is no reasonable expectation that
the communications would not be intercepted. 82 New Hampshire does not
have any secrecy requirement or explicitly establish a reasonableexpectation-of-privacy standard, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court
76. REPORTER’S RECORDING GUIDE, supra note 75.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (2019).
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2021) (“Where consent by all parties is needed
pursuant to this chapter, consent shall be considered obtained whenever one party has
announced to all other parties engaged in the communication or conversation, in any
reasonably effective manner, that such communication or conversation is about to be
recorded or transmitted: PROVIDED, That if the conversation is to be recorded that said
announcement shall also be recorded.”).
81. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401(13)(i); Agnew v. State, 197 A.3d 27,
35 (Md. 2018) (defining an “oral communication” as being spoken in private); Reporter’s
Recording Guide: Maryland, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 2020),
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/maryland/; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1,
5/14-2 (2014) (defining the offense of eavesdropping on a “private conversation” and
“private electronic communication”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/108B (1976) (defining “private
communication”); Reporter’s Recording Guide: Illinois, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS (May 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/illinois/.
82. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (1988); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 235 A.3d 311, 320 (Pa.
2020).
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has permitted constructive consent when the totality of circumstances
demonstrated that the subject was aware of the recording. 83
B. State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws
Wiretapping laws were crafted to target surveillance by law enforcement,
as well as privacy-invasive conduct by individuals. But the outsized role
that private industry now occupies in creating, selling, and licensing
surveillance technologies means that the conduct targeted by wiretap laws
is also subject to laws intended to constrain predatory trade practices, such
as state and federal unfairness and deception statutes and COPPA. Unlike
the wiretap statutes, these laws generally lack a private right of action,
making their enforceability contingent on the resources, priorities, and
political will of regulators who have often struggled to hold tech companies
accountable for privacy violations. 84 Consumer protection statutes are
nevertheless an additional area of the law that always-on devices appear to
frequently violate, and the statutes represent another area of law where the
status quo approach to privacy rights is ill-adapted to how people actually
use and understand data-collecting technologies.
The FTC is the primary consumer privacy regulator in the United States,
and deceptive trade practices are the bread and butter of FTC privacy
policy.85 The reasonable belief that a company made deceptive statements
or omissions about its products and services in a way that would materially
mislead a reasonable consumer entitles the agency to seek injunctive and
monetary relief from a company to be sanctioned by an internal
administrative law judge or a federal court.86 These sanctions include
83. State v. Locke, 761 A.2d 376, 380–81 (N.H. 1999) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
570-A:1 to 570-A:11 (1986 & Supp. 1999)).
84. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L.
REV. 773, 774–76 (2020) (describing how privacy law is failing to constrain privacy
violations, in part due to the hollowing out of public enforcement mechanisms); Justin
Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 355, 356 (2015) (same); Craig Timberg, Sex, Drugs, and Self-Harm: Where 20 Years
of Child Online Protection Law Went Wrong, WASH. POST (June 13, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/13/sex-drugs-self-harm-where-yearschild-online-protection-law-went-wrong/ (discussing COPPA’s failure to reign in pervasive
collection and misuse of children’s data, largely due to underenforcement).
85. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628 (2014) (describing the FTC’s use of its deception
authority in privacy cases).
86. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1–
2, 2 n.4, 5–6 (Sept. 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/ftc-report-congress-privacy-security
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corrective marketing campaigns, refunds, and other measures intended to
specifically and generally deter corporate predation. 87 Misleading
representations might take the form of advertising materials, privacy
policies, statements by executives, and other descriptions of the product or
service that would lead the consumer to make a purchasing decision they
would have declined to make with relevant information. Relevant privacy
cases have rested on circumstances like a children’s toy company falsely
stating in a privacy policy that consumer information would be encrypted
when it was not,88 a payment app mischaracterizing the extent to which
consumer transactions were visible to the public, 89 a router company that
touted the security of its product while leaving consumers vulnerable to
their webcams being hacked, 90 and similar cases based on misleading
representations and contravened expectations. 91 State statutes targeting
unfair and deceptive trade practices offer attorneys general the opportunity
to pursue similar claims,92 and the FTC sometimes works with them on
particular cases.93 Unfair and deceptive practice statutes have served as a
privacy stopgap in the void left by the absence of a federal comprehensive
privacy law, and the statutes are both highly relevant to the problem of
(describing consumer redress approaches, including the new constraints placed on the
agency’s ability to obtain monetary relief for consumers by a recent Supreme Court case,
AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021)).
87. Id. at 1–2, 4–6.
88. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Electronic Toy Maker VTech Settles FTC
Allegations That It Violated Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/electronic-toy-maker-vtech-settlesftc-allegations-it-violated.
89. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, PayPal Settles FTC Charges That Venmo
Failed to Disclose Information to Consumers About the Ability to Transfer Funds and
Privacy Settings; Violated Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2018/02/paypal-settles-ftc-charges-venmo-failed-discloseinformation.
90. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges D-Link Put Consumers’ Privacy
at Risk Due to the Inadequate Security of Its Computer Routers and Cameras (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-d-link-put-consumersprivacy-risk-due-inadequate.
91. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85, at 629–30 (describing additional privacy
deception cases).
92. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016).
93. FTC Hearing #14: Roundtable with State Attorneys General, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(June 12, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-14roundtable-state-attorneys-general.
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surreptitious and accidental recordings by always-on devices and deeply
reflective of the flawed vision of notice and choice as an effective method
of privacy governance. Policing broken promises can be valuable, but given
that a company can avoid liability for disclosing exploitative practices in a
sufficiently artful way, more focus on the practices themselves is needed. 94
The FTC and state attorneys general also enforce COPPA, which
governs companies’ collection and use of children’s private information.
The statute requires companies that direct online services to children under
the age of thirteen, or that have actual knowledge they are collecting the
personal information of children under thirteen, to provide clear and
conspicuous notice of their collection and use to their parents and obtain
their verifiable consent, among other requirements. 95 Given that children
are subjected to recording by always-on devices intended for adults as well
as always-on devices intended for child-specific use, 96 COPPA is similarly
relevant here.
C. The Role of Consent and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Consent plays a pivotal role in the privacy laws that govern alwayslistening devices. In the case of the Wiretap Act and one-party consent state
statutes, one person assenting to recording means that the other party to the
conversation can be legally recorded without their knowledge. 97 When
sued, companies are certain to argue that device owners consented to
94. See Brookman, supra note 84, at 358 (“Under this line of [FTC deception] cases, the
baseline privacy law in the United States was effectively ‘don’t go out of your way to lie
about what you do.’”).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
96. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR A COMMERCIAL-FREE CHILDHOOD ET AL., IN RE REQUEST
FOR INVESTIGATION OF AMAZON, INC.’S ECHO DOT KIDS EDITION FOR VIOLATING THE
CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT iii-iv (2019), https://www.law.georgetown.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Echo-Dot-Complaint-FINAL-1.pdf; E.J. Dickson, Kids’
Toys Are the Latest Battleground in the Online Privacy Wars, VOX (Dec. 13, 2018, 1:16 PM
EST), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/21/18106917/kids-holiday-gifts-connectedtoys (describing the COPPA concerns stemming from toys with audio recording capabilities,
ensuing advocacy campaigns, and responses by the FTC and other consumer privacy
regulators); GINA STEVENS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10051, SMART TOYS AND THE
CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1998 (Jan. 8, 2018), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10051 (same).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield Grp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 938,
951 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Christina Wong, Comment, The Need for the Federal Wiretap Act to
Expand Protection of Our Wireless Communications, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 333, 358 (2013)
(describing consent as “immediately remov[ing] a subject from the statute’s protections”).
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accidental recordings because they had to tick an “I accept” box below a
privacy policy to use the device. 98 Courts start from the argument that
acceptance of a privacy policy can be sufficient to establish explicit
consent, though the validity of the consent tends to rely on the discrepancy
between the alleged conduct and the company’s description of it, ignoring
the problem of unequal bargaining power, decision fatigue, and other
factors that prevent privacy policies from facilitating informed privacy
decision-making. 99 Vague descriptions of data use may not be sufficient for
a company to successfully argue that users provided explicit consent for
any and all uses of their data,100 but that will depend on the specific
language of the policy that very few people are likely to read, even fewer
will understand, and hardly anyone will be in a position to correctly process
the associated risks, much less respond to them accordingly.
Consent is also fundamental to the substance and enforcement of
consumer privacy laws, including unfairness and deceptive practice statutes
and COPPA, without accounting for the practical realities of the cognitive
limitations that skew privacy decision-making,101 structural obstacles to the
ability to reject undesirable terms, or meaningful requirements for knowing,

98. See, e.g., In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In
re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2013); Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
99. In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 (considering whether Yahoo email
users provided consent vitiating their Wiretap Act claims that the company had intercepted
their electronic communications, and determining that the users’ acceptance of the Yahoo
privacy policy and the fact that it was available to them constituted “explicit” consent); In re
Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 WL 5423918, at *14 (explaining that a reasonable user
“would not have necessarily understood” Gmail’s privacy policy to permit
additional methods of obtaining electronic communications and uses of those
communications); Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1046 (“In light of the specific language of the
license agreement, the Court concludes that a reasonable iMessage user would not be
adequately notified that Apple would intercept his or her messages when doing so would not
‘facilitate delivery’ of the messages.”).
100. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 847 (holding that Facebook users’ acceptance of a
privacy policy that disclosed that the company “may use the information we received about
you” for “data analysis” was “not specific enough to establish that users expressly consented
to the scanning of the content of their messages—which are described as ‘private
messages’—for alleged use in targeted advertising”).
101. Solove, supra note 6, at 1883–88.
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voluntary, and well-informed consent.102 The FTC has long considered
notice and choice the bedrock of its approach to consumer privacy
enforcement.103 Historically, most of its enforcement has targeted how a
company deceives its users, rather than normative condemnation of the
practices the company sought to hide. 104 Yet that procedural approach to
privacy enforcement sets a low bar for business practices considered worthy
of sanction.105 It is relatively easy for a company to provide a legally
sufficient form of notice, but there is a vast distance between what that
notice entails and the kind of informed autonomy that consent regimes
assume that notice can foster.106
Indeed, the fallacies underlying the logic of consent regimes in privacy
laws have been repeatedly documented and widely decried. 107 The notion
that providing disclosures about collection practices will enable informed
consumer choices and thus prevent widespread privacy invasions ignores
lack of information, cognitive difficulties hindering meaningful decisionmaking, 108 lack of available alternatives, and other structural difficulties

102. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 61 (arguing that consent is a valuable mechanism
that privacy law currently relies upon too heavily in ways that redound to the detriment of
individual privacy and autonomy).
103. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE : A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998)
(describing notice as the “fundamental” basis of the agency’s privacy approach); see also
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85, at 634 (describing notice and choice as “one of the most
central aspects” of the agency’s work).
104. See G.S. Hans, Note, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement:
Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
163, 165 (2012) (describing the FTC’s reliance on its deception authority in privacy cases).
105. Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelligence, &
Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 525 (2018) (“The idea that
privacy controls such as notice and choice are adequate to protect consumers in the current
environment has been described as quaint.”).
106. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 61, at 1471–72.
107. The Editorial Board, How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-facebook-googleconsent.html; Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and
Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (2019) [hereinafter Barrett,
Confiding in Con Men] (describing years of critiques of notice-and-choice privacy
governance by policymakers, privacy scholars, social scientists, and consumer advocates).
108. Lindsey Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law &
Governance, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J., no. 1, 2018, at 1, https://digitalcommons.
law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=chtlj
[hereinafter
Barrett,
Model(ing) Privacy] (discussing literature documenting the hindering effects of bounded
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that make “take it or leave it” an ineffective privacy governance
mechanism. People encounter far too many data-collecting technologies in
a day to make reading the privacy policy of each one a rational choice, 109
and even if they tried to read each one, the information they contain is often
insufficient to explain the relevant risks, if not outright misleading. 110 More
importantly, the most clearly written privacy policy in the world can’t
facilitate meaningful choice in a highly consolidated ecosystem where an
alternative product or service just doesn’t exist.111 Nor can it improve the
highly limited human capacity to effectively evaluate risk. 112 The rosy
picture of a frictionless interaction fueled by perfect information also
ignores the inconvenient reality of how corporate incentives are shaped by
money, power, and regulatory inaction. Years of “light-touch” governance
have facilitated the growth of a technological ecosystem that blames people
for choices they’re ill-equipped to make, all while their information is
bought and sold by companies they’ve never engaged with. 113
Smartphones, for example, are a functionally unavoidable part of modern
life. Many people rely on them to do their jobs and stay in touch with
family and friends, and the few who don’t are frequently within recording
range of those who do. 114 The idea that phone owners’ clicked agreement to
rationality, hyperbolic discounting, the difficulty with assessing cumulative risk, and
decision fatigue hindering privacy decision-making).
109. See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008) (noting that privacy policies
can take a significant time to skim and are encountered on many websites by Internet users).
110. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Polices: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 86–87 (2015); Lorrie Faith
Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and
Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy,
Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 77 (2018).
111. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, I Cut the ‘Big Five’ Tech Giants from My Life. It Was Hell,
GIZMODO (Feb. 7, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://gizmodo.com/i-cut-the-big-five-tech-giantsfrom-my-life-it-was-hel-1831304194.
112. Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 43
(2021).
113. See, e.g., Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control
Paradox, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340, 341 (2012) (noting that “users have
very little control over the way in which information, once posted [on Facebook], will be
used by a third-party application”).
114. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Cell phone
location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term. . . . [C]ell
phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’
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an inscrutable policy constitutes informed consent for secretly recording
their conversations and using that information for any purpose seems like a
fairytale’s contract used to teach children about unfairness. And yet, the
legal fiction that clicking past a boilerplate privacy policy that no one in
their right mind would read constitutes “control” over one’s privacy choices
persists, carefully guarded by the powerful entities whose profits depend on
acceptance of the myth.115
The primacy of hinging privacy protections on people’s expectations of
privacy has also been criticized, if not to quite the same degree. The Fourth
Amendment’s Katz test—requiring a probable-cause warrant before a
search or seizure of persons, papers, or effects by the government, absent
consent or a litany of other exceptions—has been characterized as circular,
given that prediction of a privacy invasion is tantamount to acceptance
thereof.116 The Fourth Amendment’s reliance on the Katz standard is
directly relevant for the Wiretap Act, as its drafters were responding to the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the topic, and judges have frequently
that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.” (citing Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014))).
115. While technology companies in the United States argued for years against any sort
of privacy regulation whatsoever, their messaging strategy has shifted to pushing for weak
privacy laws based on notice and choice that emphasize “transparency” and “control.” See
Barrett, Confiding in Con Men, supra note 107, at 1065, 1071; Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion,
The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2019, at A15, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-facts-about-facebook-11548374613 (“Ultimately, I believe the most important
principles around data are transparency, choice and control. We need to be clear about the
ways we’re using information, and people need to have clear choices about how their
information is used. We believe regulation that codifies these principles across the internet
would be good for everyone.”); Sundar Pichai, Opinion, Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy
Should Not Be a Luxury Good, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2019, at A25, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/07/opinion/google-sundar-pichai-privacy.html (“Privacy is personal, which makes it
even more vital for companies to give people clear, individual choices around how their data
is used.”); see also Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 444 (2016) (criticizing the “control illusion”).
116. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
139 (2016) (“[A] knowledge-based Fourth Amendment will shrink and weaken over time as
public awareness of new technologies and threats to privacy continues to grow.”); see also
U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY : ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 18 (1985) (reviewing the
need to update the Wiretap Act to include electronic communications) (“Determining
whether a place is sufficiently private to offer protection against official surveillance is more
and more difficult as the public sphere of activities encroaches on what was once deemed
private.”).
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read the statute’s “expectation of non-interception” test to be
interchangeable with it.117 Privacy expectations are also a key component
analyzing what would deceive a “reasonable consumer” in the context of
unfair and deceptive trade practice enforcement. 118 Consumer privacy
scholars have highlighted the role that resignation and learned helplessness
play in how people perceive their privacy choices; if your data is constantly
collected and used without your permission, and there is rarely any
meaningful opportunity to prevent that from happening, it can be difficult to
find a reason to “expect” privacy at all. 119
A race to the bottom that denies protections in response to the rational
conclusion that past experiences can be predictive erodes privacy
protections against surreptitious recordings. As always-listening devices
become more and more prevalent, judges may decide that the expectation of
being recorded is more rational than the expectation of being let alone. As
the expectation of non-interception is part of the definition of “oral
communications,” that logic would exclude surreptitious listening from
being subject to the Wiretap Act at all, while a consumer acting
“reasonably” will be required to expect and guard against privacy invasions
they can’t avoid. Expectations are not a sufficient mechanism for gauging
the appropriateness of privacy protections under such circumstances.
IV. The Study
As detailed above, privacy expectations and preferences affect the
applicability of the Wiretap Act’s protections for oral communications,
certain state wiretap statutes, deception and unfairness enforcement by the
117. See Bast, supra note 67, at 842.
118. CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 123–
25 (2016); McSweeny, supra note 105, at 517 (describing the modern FTC’s approach as
“address[ing] reasonable consumer expectations regarding the collection, use, and protection
of their data”).
119. Nora A. Draper & Joseph Turow, The Corporate Cultivation of Digital Resignation,
21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1824, 1825 (2019); Madiha Tabassum et al., “I Don’t Own the Data”:
End User Perceptions of Smart Home Device Data Practices and Risks, in USENIX,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 435, 443–46
(2019), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups2019-tabassum.pdf (describing participants
in a study on the privacy attitudes of smart home users as being subject to “optimism bias”—
the assumption that a possible risk is unlikely to occur for the subject personally—and
reporting participants’ assumptions that they incur only “marginal” additional risk to their
privacy from the use of smart home devices when compared to the information already
collected about them).
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FTC and state attorneys general, and privacy torts, 120 and these expectations
and preferences are frequently highlighted in discussions of what new
privacy laws should look like. 121 With the outsized role of expectations and
consent in privacy law and policy in mind, one of us conducted a study
examining participants’ privacy preferences, expectations, and decisionmaking concerning the use of voice-activated assistant technologies,
whether as a stand-alone device in their home or as a smartphone app.122
Previous privacy and security research has examined the privacy
preferences, knowledge, and behaviors of voice assistant and smart speaker
users,123 as well as the problem of bystanders having data collected about
them without their knowledge or consent. 124 But only a few studies have
120. This Article does not examine the role of the privacy torts in depth, primarily
because they don’t play as large a role in corporate considerations of privacy risks and are
thus less influential for the kinds of invasions that occur. See generally Neil M. Richards,
The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 384 (2011); Danielle
K. Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (2010) (“[T]he privacy
torts often cannot properly redress contemporary privacy injuries.”); Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 85, at 587 (citing The Limits of Tort Privacy by Neil M. Richards and noting that
“common law torts fail to regulate the majority of activities concerning privacy”); Scott
Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2018)
(describing privacy tort law as “beleaguered”).
121. Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy, supra note 108, at 35 (describing the role of privacy
expectations in policy discussions).
122. Liccardi & Dominguez Veiga, supra note 1.
123. See, e.g., Josephine Lau et al., “Alexa, Stop Recording”: Mismatches Between
Smart Speaker Privacy Controls and User Needs (Sept. 2018) (poster presented at the
Fourteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)),
https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/soups2018posters-lau.pdf (finding that voice
assistant users have an incomplete understanding of related privacy risks and rarely adopt
available privacy controls); Noura Abdi et al., Privacy Norms for Smart Home Personal
Assistants, in ACM, CHI ’21: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2021 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS paper 558 (2021), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/
3411764.3445122 (registration required) (applying Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity
framework to a range of scenarios involving privacy preference regarding recording,
focusing exclusively on the device owner as the subject).
124. Eric Zeng et al., End User Security & Privacy Concerns with Smart Homes, in
USENIX, PROCEEDINGS OF SOUPS 2017: THIRTEENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY 65 (2017), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2017/soups2017zeng.pdf (examining, inter alia, the “mismatch between the concerns and power of the smart
home administrator and other people in the home”); Eric Zeng & Franziska Roesner,
Understanding and Improving Security and Privacy in Multi-User Smart Homes: A Design
Exploration and In-Home User Study, in USENIX, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH USENIX
SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 159 (2019), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-zeng.pdf
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focused on how device owners consider sharing behaviors when captured
audio includes accidental recordings of other people. 125 “Wiretapping Your
Friends” addresses a key question that has gone unanswered by the
literature: given technologies that can accidentally and surreptitiously
record both the device owner and unsuspecting bystanders, what do the
owners of those devices believe is their responsibility towards those people,
and how do they evaluate different privacy risks? The researchers hoped to
develop a better understanding of the factors influencing people’s
willingness to allow audio recordings to be captured and shared.
To answer those questions and assess people’s preferences, perceptions,
and behavior relating to potentially surreptitious recordings by voiceassistant technologies, the researchers created a mixed-method empirical
study of cross-sectional and longitudinal observations. 126 The bespoke apps
(examining “how peoples’ behavior and usage of the smart home can impact each others’
security and privacy”); Yaxing Yao et al., Privacy Perceptions and Designs of Bystanders in
Smart Homes, 3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION article 3 (Nov. 2019),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359161 (examining the privacy perceptions and
concerns of bystanders themselves); Karola Marky et al., “I Don’t Know How to Protect
Myself”: Understanding Privacy Perceptions Resulting from the Presence of Bystanders in
Smart Environments, in ACM, NORDICHI’20: THE 11TH NORDIC CONFERENCE ON HUMANCOMPUTER INTERACTION article 4 (2020) (examining the problem of voice assistants
violating the privacy of their owners to bystanders, and noting that both device owners and
bystanders reported “wish[ing] for a device mode that considers the presence of
bystanders”); Martin J. Kraemer et al., Further Exploring Communal Technology Use in
Smart Homes: Social Expectations, in ACM, CHI’20: EXTENDED ABSTRACTS OF THE 2020
CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS LBW116 (2020),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.04661.pdf (online study examining communal use of technology
in smart homes, touching briefly on how participants considered the privacy concerns of
guests in offering to pair their phones with smart home systems); Christine Geeng &
Franziska Roesner, Who’s in Control?: Interactions in Multi-User Smart Homes, in ACM,
CHI 2019: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS paper 268, at 9–10 (2019), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3290605.3300498
(briefly noting the privacy implications of recording devices in smart homes for guests and
other non-residents).
125. Hyunji Chung et al., Alexa, Can I Trust You?, COMPUTER, Sep. 2017, at 100;
Schönherr et al., supra note 56; Dubois et al., supra note 55 (providing a systematic review
of false positives).
126. Liccardi & Dominguez Veiga, supra note 1, at 5.
Procedure and Participants in the study:
Participants: The study was advertised in twenty-one of the thirty-eight one-party
consent states, excluding Nevada (a one-party consent state in which the Supreme Court
interprets the law as requiring all-party consent). Id. at 8. Participants were recruited through
different social media groups, e-mail mailing lists, Craigslist, and paper flyers posted in
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and devices examined included Amazon Alexa, Google Home, and apps
like OK Google and Samsung Bixby.127 Current users and non-users of
voice-activated devices who wanted to participate in the study were first
interviewed and asked about their capture and sharing preferences
regarding audio recordings. In particular, the researchers inquired about
how participants would choose to share or not share audio recordings that
captured utterances by other individuals. 128
Next, the researchers had participants install a bespoke app129 on their
smartphones designed to capture audio files, and then interviewed subjects
before and after it was installed to gauge their privacy behavior associated
with voice-activated devices. 130 The initial interview was conducted to
evaluate participants’ existing perceptions, preferences, and usage of voice
assistants, including their perceptions of how the respective companies
behind the devices capture and use the data.131 This was then followed by a
one-to-one information session to familiarize participants with the study
procedures and to install a bespoke Experience Sampling Method (“ESM”)
Android app.132 The app collected data on the participants’ preferences and
usage of voice assistants, as well as their perceptions on how the respective
companies behind the devices would use their data.133 After this
public spaces. Id. at 6. Fifty-three participants completed the study: eighteen females (avg.
age = 32), thirty-four males (avg. age = 31), and one non-binary individual (avg. age = 21).
Id. at 11–12. These participants were spread across nineteen one-party consent states:
Alabama, 1; Georgia, 2; Idaho, 1; Indiana, 3; Kentucky, 1; Louisiana, 1; New Jersey, 4; New
York, 3; North Carolina, 5; Ohio, 1; Oregon, 2; South Carolina, 3; Tennessee, 2; Texas, 3;
Utah, 1; Vermont, 11; Virginia, 6; West Virginia, 1; Wisconsin, 2. Id. at 12, 12 n.19.
Procedure: People wanting to participate in the study signed up using an online
questionnaire. Participants were asked to confirm the state in which they were located (this
was corroborated during the information session) as well as provide demographic
information and ownership and usage of their own voice-activated devices. Id. at 6.
Participants who met the study requirements (i.e., were located in the one-party consent
states) were contacted and asked to meet online using video conference software with the
researchers. Id. at 8. The study was approved by an internal review board.
127. Id. at 5, 9. The researchers did not study Apple devices. See id. at 11 (noting that the
app for data collection was compatible only with Android devices).
128. Id. at 5.
129. Study participants were told that the researchers wanted to test a new voice
detection algorithm and compare it to the results from the Google Speech API. Id. at 6.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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longitudinal experience phase, the researchers interviewed participants
again to assess whether any of their answers deviated from the data sharing
and collection preferences that they initially reported.134
Several trends in participants’ reported perceptions and behaviors
illustrate the mismatch between a consent-focused legal regime and the
responses of always-on device owners to the privacy concerns of the people
around them. Key factors that weighed heavily on the participants’
decisions included the perceived or known preferences of other
individual(s) captured in the audio recording; 135 the content of the
recording; the participants’ own perceived preferences; 136 the participants’
own perceived benefits from sharing the information; 137 and in particular,
the intimacy of the relationship with the other individual(s) captured in the
audio recording. 138 Participants carefully considered the privacy preferences
of close-knit relations, which heavily influenced whether they shared
recordings or took part in the study. 139 But participants frequently
disregarded the preferences of more distant relationships, such as
colleagues, clients, or doctors.140 With the exception of two participants
who informed people of the study on a need-to-know basis, and three
participants who did not disclose it to anyone (even their spouse or partner),
the remainder disclosed the aim of the study to close-knit relations, who
were often recorded. 141
Participants reported considering and even often asking people they were
close to about their specific preferences (related to a captured conversation)
or general preferences (related to their preferences about sharing their
information for the duration of the study) when they believed the other
person would likely be recorded.142 In fact, in some cases their loved ones’
preferences took precedence over their own.143 Participant 2 reported that

134. Id.
135. Id. at 21–23.
136. Id. at 13–14.
137. Id. at 20.
138. Id. at 21–23.
139. Id. at 21.
140. Id. at 22.
141. Id. at 21. One participant disclosed their participation in the study to their partner
after a couple of weeks, as they were starting a new relationship and were afraid that it might
not had been received well. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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he would have shared more had it not been for his partner’s uneasiness of
sharing even “complete random nonsense” and not wanting to lie to her:
[Participant 2:] I started to select ‘not sharing’ when she was
involved so that I could definitely and honestly tell her that I had
done so.144
Even in instances where close-knit relations were not informed about the
study, participants reported considering them when making their choices:
[Participant 35:] I thought that whatever didn’t connect the
person to the information that was being recorded would be all
right to share [. . .], there were some times where confidently
talking to each other—like about personal stuff—I wouldn’t
share even if it didn’t have any identifying content. Just like
trying to fulfil their wishes.145
That was not always the case when children were involved. For example,
Participant 6 reported sharing conversations that captured them disciplining
their child. 146
In contrast, the thirty-one participants who reported being employed
decided not to share the information with their colleagues. 147 Participants
explained that it could have caused problems and might have affected the
way in which people would have reacted around them. 148 For example,
Participant 2 reported making the decision for them because they were not
sharing the information anyway:
[Participant 2:] If I ask anybody if they were okay with it—about
what was going on—they had said, ‘yes, that's okay, [they] can
release my information.’ That’s essentially either accidentally or
intentionally violating our company policy so either way it did
not make sense [to ask them]. I was deciding for them because

144. Id.
145. Id. at 22 (second alteration in original).
146. Id. (“I did not ask him because he might not want to share it but I would. In fact, I
would welcome it, to share it with companies in case they could help with parenting tips,
being a single parent and all.”).
147. Id. at 21.
148. Id.
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even if that’s a yes it was going against what [they] should have
really said [. . .] I was making the smart decision for them.149
Participant 2 continued to explain that even in circumstances where the
information could have been shared, he chose not to share those recordings
with researchers because he would have wanted to inform his colleagues:
[Participant 2:] There were some conversations that were
actually not work related so could be shared but it goes back to
my previous point because I have to tell that it is on all the
time — even when we are having conversations that should be
isolated — so I decided for all or nothing situation whether I will
just tell everybody or I will just not tell anybody and assume that
no sharing would happen.150
Participants also reported instances in which they were willing to violate
what they perceived and knew to be their colleagues’ preferences and
shared conversations when they knew those colleagues might be recorded.
One participant reported that his colleagues would likely object to being
recorded given that they move out of frame when he takes pictures, but the
participant did not care about respecting those clear preferences.151
Furthermore, when people from distant or non-existent relations were
also captured, participants (with the exception of two) reported not
consulting or even considering their possible preferences. 152 Only a small
number of friends were asked about their preferences, while the remainder
of the distant relationships—clients, acquaintances, health professionals or
strangers—were never asked. 153 In fact, when distant or non-existent
relations were part of a recording, participants reported their preferences
took precedence even if that meant knowingly contravening the preferences
of others. Participant 13 reported instances where they felt as though they
probably should have not shared the information, even to the point of
feeling that they should have not recorded it at all, but did so regardless.
[Participant 13:] If I had told people, I felt like I would have
liked created a problem that I did not know how to solve,
theoretically I could have put my phone somewhere else but then
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. (second, third, and fifth alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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I would have not had my phone . . . that it make me feel more
uncomfortable, so I kept it.154
Participants reported not needing to consider or even think about distant
people’s preferences when deciding how to share the recording, given that
they were not the ones participating or deciding in the first place. 155
[Participant 19:] I did not really care if other people heard it or
not and if other people (in the conversation) do, that is on them,
if they differ from my opinion honestly I just didn’t care [. . .] I
did not really think about what they wanted as much, it was my
decision whether to share it or not.156
For the few participants who reported considering distant relations in their
decision-making process, their expectation of privacy was very low to none,
which they attributed to the types of listening devices that are available and
popular today. 157
[Participant 23:] In 2019, I think it’s inevitable with all of the
smart devices happening, you know, your information, all
information, you know is essentially public at this point [. . .] if I
wanted to not share something, I wouldn’t talk about it in the
vicinity of any of my smart devices, actually, so I think, you
know, I care less because I understand how much less privacy
there is.158
V. Implications for Existing Privacy Laws
The study’s reported consent practices point to a likely failure of many
companies to comply with existing wiretap laws, as well as unfair and
deceptive practices statutes and COPPA. Not only are accidental recordings
capturing device owners without their consent, but it is highly unlikely that
third parties are aware that they might be recorded, or that their consent is
being obtained in any sort of way. The following section discusses how
154. Id. at 22 (second alteration in original). This participant also shared these instances
when the study did not require them to. The researchers further inquired about this behavior
and their motivations for their choices, and the participant reported that “it was their [the
participant’s] decision to do so.” Id.
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id. (second alteration in original).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 22–23 (second alteration in original).
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companies are likely violating those laws and why their available legal
defenses will often be untenable.
A. State and Federal Wiretapping Laws
As discussed in Section III.A, federal and state wiretapping statutes
prohibit the intentional interception and disclosure of the contents of wire,
electronic, and oral communications unless the interceptor is a party to the
communications, obtains consent from one of the parties, or one of a few
exceptions applies. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
intentionally intercepted the contents of an oral communication using a
device. 159 Intentionally disclosing, using, or endeavoring to disclose or use
the contents of communications that the person or entity knew or had
reason to know were obtained in violation of the statute is also
prohibited. 160
In the case of an always-on device, the company operating the device
intentionally intercepts the contents of oral communications—not merely
metadata, or attributes about the recording like the date or length of
recording, but the recording itself—when the always-on device sends a
recording to the cloud for processing. These recordings are most aptly
characterized as “oral communications” under the Federal Wiretap Act, 161
as they are utterances by people who believe their conversations are not
being recorded by their devices (such as device owners when their devices
are accidentally recording them, or bystanders unaware that they could be
or are being recorded), in a circumstance justifying that expectation. 162
159. See supra Section III.A.
160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a)–(d).
161. There is some variation in how state wiretap statutes define “oral communications,”
with most states following the federal language minus the reference to electronic
communications
(which
Congress
added
in
1986).
Arizona,
Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Washington do not define “oral
communications” specifically, while Florida’s definition excludes “any public oral
communication uttered at a public meeting.” 1 JAMES G. CARR ET AL., LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE § 3:5 (rev. ed. Aug. 2021).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2); see also Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 211 n.7 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.
McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1993); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2178 (1968) (stating
the legislature intended the statutory definition for “oral communication” to reflect preexisting law). The Wiretap Act’s statutory definition requires an oral communication to be
“uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2), which
was drafted in response to Fourth Amendment cases and mimics Justice Harlan’s language
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The Wiretap Act defines “intercept[ion]” as “the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 163 Courts
have not categorically defined when the act of “interception” takes place,
and the analysis will be fact specific. We believe that a voice-activated
device sending recordings to a remote server—i.e., to the company—
constitutes an “acquisition.” The device company likely does not “acquire”
the contents of oral communications when a device does not rely on cloudbased computers to process requests, such that the recordings remain on the
user’s device without ever being sent to a remote server. 164 The companies
would also be separately liable for “use,” such as using the recordings for
targeted advertising or improving the machine learning capabilities of their
devices, or “disclosure” to third parties (such as contractors).
The intentionality requirement demonstrates why interceptions should be
attributed to the service provider and not the device owner: the very
problem with always-on devices is that both the owner and the other parties
being recorded will often be unaware that false positive recordings are
happening. The “Wiretapping Your Friends” study involved informing
in Katz of “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” where “society is prepared to
recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Some courts have referred to the Wiretap Act’s requirement
as a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” though some commenters have suggested that
conflation of the two tests would nullify certain scenarios involving § 2511(2)(d)’s
prohibition on intercepting one’s own conversation for a criminal or tortious purpose.
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63, § 2:27. But see CARR ET AL., supra note 161, § 3:5.
(“Although either view—expectation of privacy or non-interception—might be appropriate,
the more accurate assessment, based on the legislative history of Title III, is whether a
reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy exists.”); Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C.A. § 2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose
Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication Is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of
Act, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 139, § 2[a] (2000) (“The statutory definition has been referred to in
short-hand fashion as a reasonable expectation of privacy.”) (noting that some courts have
required a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in civil actions under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 and
others have required the plaintiff to show a “protectable expectation that his or her oral
communications would not be intercepted”).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
164. For example, Amazon’s Alexa can revert to processing recordings on the user’s
device for limited functions when it cannot sufficiently rely on an internet connection, which
it needs to send recordings to Amazon’s cloud. Alexa Confidentiality and Data Handling
Overview, supra note 50, at 4 n.2. A device that processed recordings locally, without ever
sending them to the company’s remote servers for analysis, could avoid this problem.
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participants that their devices would record others in order to gauge what
participants believed their social obligations were in a range of scenarios,
but most device users, including the users of voice-activated devices
specifically, aren’t terribly knowledgeable about the privacy risks their
devices create.165 The overwhelming majority of device owners couldn’t
“intentionally” record the oral communications of the people around them,
because they won’t realize that the accidental recordings are happening.
What’s more, these recordings are “unintentional” in so far as the device is
recording due to its incorrect perception that someone has uttered the wake
word. But the companies selling the devices are aware of this deficiency
and nevertheless profit from the recordings they produce, which should be
sufficient to demonstrate intentionality. 166 A software bug could be
unintentional, but the choice to build a profitable infrastructure around a
bug is not. Moreover, one-party wiretap laws like the federal statute and
those in thirty-eight states are generally predicated on the idea that the act
of interception necessarily involves a third party.167
In the case of the Wiretap Act, the “expectation of non-interception”
requirement in the definition should also be met in many cases involving
always-on devices. The expectation does not depend on the sensitivity of
what is recorded, but rather the expectation that the conversation is not
recorded; 168 a banal conversation where the utterer had reason to believe the
conversation is not recorded, such as small talk made in a dressing room at
a volume that would be difficult to overhear, would most likely be
protected. 169 A Superior Court of New Jersey case involving a television
165. Lau et al., supra note 123.
166. See, e.g., Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see
also in re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 815–16 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“The
Court agrees with Plaintiffs and these various courts that interceptions may be considered
intentional where a defendant is aware of the defect causing interception and takes no
remedial action. . . . To be clear, the Court does not hold that inaction in the face of a known
design defect necessarily makes an interception ‘intentional’ under the Wiretap Act—only
that the facts alleged here are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” (emphasis added)).
167. Rauvin Johl, Reassessing Wiretap and Eavesdropping Statutes: Making One-Party
Consent the Default, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 181–82 (2018) (citing Billeci v. United
States, 184 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1950)) (concluding that, based on the assumption of
third-party involvement, “recordings made by a party or with a party’s consent should not
qualify as eavesdropping or wiretapping”).
168. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63, § 2:24.
169. See, e.g., LaPorte v. State, 512 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
speech made between models when “in a state of undress or in the process of changing
clothes” was private, based upon the models’ expectation of privacy); Planned Parenthood
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network sued by police officers for filming them provided a non-exhaustive
list of factors bearing on the expectation of non-interception, including the
volume of the conversation, the proximity of others in earshot, the potential
for communications to be reported, the steps taken by speakers to protect
their privacy, whether “technological enhancements” are required to hear
the conversation, and where the conversation takes place.170 The potential
scenarios involving always-on devices vary wildly, but many should find
favor under those factors particularly given the assurances people receive
from always-on device companies that the device only records on
command, the fact that they’re generally used indoors, and the recording
device itself is a “technological enhancement.”
The unavoidability of the false positives should also make it more likely
that a court will find that a plaintiff has an expectation of noninterception.171 Making privacy self-help a prerequisite for legal protections
has troubling implications given how difficult and ultimately futile any selfhelp attempts tend to be. The flaws of that standard aside, it would be
difficult to blame most plaintiffs for failing to avail themselves of privacyprotective steps that they’re either unaware of or simply don’t exist. 172 In a
case involving a conversation recorded via the plaintiff’s pocket dial, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found his failure to
take “a number of simple and well-known measures” such as merely
Fed’n Am., Inc. v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, 402 F. Supp. 3d 615, 688–92 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(describing the test as “whether the person being recorded had a subjective expectation of
privacy and whether that expectation was reasonable under the circumstances” and
analyzing those expectations against the subjective belief in the privacy of the recorded
conversations and the steps taken to keep them private).
170. Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 593 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(citing Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 213–15 (5th Cir. 2001)).
171. The variations in the precise standards articulated in state wiretapping laws, beyond
the number of parties required to consent makes the analysis of relevant conduct slightly
different in some cases. The Wiretap Act’s preemption of less protective state laws means
that no statute may provide lesser privacy protections, but the specifics of state standards and
their subsequent interpretation over time by state courts may nevertheless be meaningful. S.
REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2187 (1968); see also Leong v. Carrier IQ Inc., Nos. CV 12-01562
GAF (MRWx), CV 12-01564 GAF (MRWx), 2012 WL 1463313, *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27,
2012) (discussing the Wiretap Act’s preemption of lesser protective state laws and sanction
of more protective ones).
172. See Huff v. Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that a plaintiff’s mere
“internal belief in privacy” is insufficient to satisfy Katz’s reasonable-expectation test and
that a plaintiff must “exhibit an intention to keep statements private” through affirmative
steps and safeguards against third-party exposure).
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locking the device, setting up a passcode, or using an anti-pocket-dial app
precluded him from exhibiting an expectation of privacy. 173 Here, false
positives will often be entirely unavoidable, given that they result from the
malfunctioning of the device, including in situations where a third party is
unaware that a device was present.
Product design choices intended to minimize potential privacy invasions
could influence a judge’s interpretation of assumption of the risk, and
companies that allow their customers to delete recordings, or to opt out of
having their recordings saved or transcribed, may argue that the plaintiff’s
expectation of non-interception is undermined by a failure to do so. Some
courts may find such an argument compelling. They should not, as it fails to
consider how difficult it is for individuals to manage their privacy
decisions, and acceptance of this line of thinking would reinforce corrosive
precedents of expecting individuals to take burdensome steps that most
people don’t take in order to receive legal protections for their privacy.
Certainly, the failure to exercise an opt-out or privacy control couldn’t be
held against someone who doesn’t have access to the device. Reasoning
behind Chief Justice Roberts’s decision in Carpenter v. United States
concerning assumption of the risk when assumption is functionally
involuntary could also support rejecting these types of argument, given that
judges frequently invoke Fourth Amendment precedents in wiretapping
cases.174
The terms of service, instructions, and marketing of always-on devices
frequently emphasize that an affirmative command, whether in the form of
a wake word or pushing a button, is required for the device to record the
user’s utterances. 175 People buy those devices believing those assurances,

173. Id. at 552.
174. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018); Lindsey Barrett,
Carpenter’s Consumers, 59 WASHBURN L.J. 53, 57 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s
analysis of assumption of the risk in expectation of privacy analysis, which repudiates the
idea that the act of carrying a smartphone can obviate a reasonable expectation of privacy).
175. See generally Is Alexa Recording?, AMAZON, https://perma.cc/H53P-V6WM (last
visited Feb. 1, 2021) (“The answer to all these questions is no. Privacy is built in to Alexa
and all of our Echo devices, from wake word technology to microphone controls to the
ability to review and delete the voice recordings associated with your account.”); Google
Nest Commitment to Privacy in the Home, GOOGLE, https://perma.cc/JB22-6M9G (last
visited Dec. 10, 2020) (“Your home is a special place. It’s where you get to decide who you
invite in. It’s the place for sharing family recipes and watching babies take first steps. You
want to trust the things you bring into your home. And we’re committed to earning that
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and they proceed about their daily lives engaging in the kinds of activity
that they would otherwise have every reason to believe is not being
recorded and collected by some company, such as private conversations in
their homes, their cars, or those of friends or colleagues. 176 The failure to
find an expectation of privacy based on the absence of self-help or
resignation to privacy invasions would profoundly erode the Wiretap Act’s
privacy protections for oral communications. Accepting the argument that
people should expect to be spied upon and taken advantage of—even when
a company violates the explicit promises to only record upon the owner’s
request, promises that those people subsequently relied upon—affirmatively
condones and invites that malfeasance.
Consent to recording from one or all of the parties plays a crucial role in
both state statutes and the Wiretap Act, and in most cases, companies are
failing to obtain it from the full array of people being recorded. Companies
almost certainly aren’t obtaining consent in all-party consent states, where
everyone being recorded must give their consent. But even in one-party
consent states, the device owner’s acceptance of a terms-of-service contract
should not suffice as consent for recording other people without their
knowledge when that consent is insufficient to permit surreptitious
recordings of even the device owner. And as the “Wiretapping Your
Friends” study illustrates, most device owners probably aren’t bothering to
alert the people around them potentially being recorded by always-on
devices. Under the Wiretap Act and one-party consent state statutes, the
interception is not prohibited if one party to the conversation gives consent
to the recording. 177 Consent must be explicit, and the subject’s awareness of
the technical possibility of interception, rather than awareness of actual
interception, is insufficient. 178 A party can provide consent to only some
communications, but not all of them. 179
trust.”); HomePod Privacy and Security, APPLE, https://perma.cc/BEK6-EH2Y (last visited
Feb. 3, 2021) (“Security and privacy are fundamental to the design of HomePod.”).
176. See generally Nest Audio, GOOGLE STORE, https://store.google.com/product/
nest_audio?hl=en-US (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) (screenshot on file with authors) (“Privacy
built in. Nest Audio is designed to protect your privacy. You can delete your history by
saying, ‘Hey Google, delete what I just said.’”); Apple Home Pod, APPLE
https://perma.cc/WEB8-H826 (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) (“HomePod and HomePod mini
keep everything private and secure, and only listen for ‘Hey Siri.’”).
177. Wong, supra note 97, at 358.
178. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983).
179. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 119 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The parameters of
consent may be circumscribed depending on the subtleties and permutations inherent in a
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The question here is whether consent obtained by the device owner’s
acceptance of a privacy policy constitutes consent to the interception of
false positive recordings. We believe it does not and should not. As Orin
Kerr emphasized in the context of internet service providers’ monitoring
their customers’ browsing history, the standard is actual consent, not
constructive consent, where the person recorded has been provided with
clear notice and opted to continue using the service regardless.180 The
overwhelming majority of people do not read privacy policies—and even if
they did, most of the popular services do not clearly describe how their
recording devices work such that users could provide informed consent. 181
Acceptance of opaque boilerplate does not constitute specific, actual
consent to unsolicited recording, particularly for non-device owners who
are recorded and will have almost never received notice of any kind.
Of course, electronic communications (like someone’s internet browsing
history) and oral communications (like conversations recorded by an
always-on device) are not directly interchangeable. But the privacy interests
in conversations the speakers had no reason to believe were being recorded
is certainly comparable to the interest in one’s browsing history,
particularly given the prevalence of always-on device being used in the
home, and the rich tradition of protections for the home as a private zone.
And as Kerr notes, most of the cases establishing the consent standard
involved the interception of telephone calls, which is a close analogue to
the utterances and conversations that an always-on device records. 182
particular set of facts.”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (“A party may
consent to the interception of only part of a communication or to the interception of only a
subset of its communications.”).
180. Orin Kerr, Opinion, The FCC’s Broadband Privacy Regulations Are Gone. But
Don’t Forget About the Wiretap Act, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/117olokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/06/the-fccs-broadband-privacyregulations-are-gone-but-don’t-forget-about-the-wiretap-act/; see also United States v.
Lanoue, 71 F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The surrounding circumstances must
convincingly show that the party knew about and consented to the interception in spite of the
lack of formal notice or deficient formal notice.”).
181. See, e.g., Kevin Litman-Navarro, Opinion, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They
Were an Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-privacy-policies.html; Kim Hart, Privacy
Policies Are Read by an Aging Few, AXIOS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.axios.com/fewpeople-read-privacy-policies-survey-fec3a29e-2e3a-4767-a05c-2cacdcbaecc8.html
(presenting survey results in which 56% of respondents reported “always” or “usually”
accepting privacy policies without reading them).
182. Kerr, supra note 180.
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Relevant decisions in which tech companies have argued that consent to a
boilerplate privacy policy is sufficient under the statute also support the
view that consent to a vague privacy policy is insufficient to excuse the
interception, use, or disclosure of surreptitious recordings. 183 An ongoing
class action alleging violations of the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications
Act, and a number of California laws based on Google’s collection of
Google Assistant recordings obtained via passive listening makes the same
argument, which the presiding judge preliminarily accepted. 184
Other consent exceptions should similarly fail to provide a defense.
Courts have made certain exceptions for consent offered on behalf of
spouses and children, but that would only extend to recording instances
involving those relationships.185 Moreover, courts have increasingly
narrowed the circumstances when spouses and parents can provide such
consent. Six circuits have held that there is no interspousal exception to the
Wiretap Act, while five have not addressed the issue. 186 Other courts have
recognized that a parent or guardian may provide consent on behalf of
minor children, but narrowed the acceptable circumstances to when the
parent has concerns about the child’s safety. 187 Parents don’t provide
consent to the makers of always-on device companies because they believe
that the company is constantly recording the child for the child’s safety, to
the extent that they knowingly provide that consent at all. 188
183. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 789–
90 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
In re Google Location Hist. Litig., 428 F. Supp. 3d 185, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (rejecting that
consent to location tracking during use of a map app constitutes consent to store location
data).
184. In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 823 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
185. Cary J. Mogerman & Stephanie L. Jones, The New Era of Electronic Eavesdropping
and Divorce: An Analysis of the Federal Law Relating to Eavesdropping and Privacy in the
Internet Age, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 481, 494–95 (2008).
186. Id. at 500.
187. State v. Whitner, 732 S.E.2d 861, 864 (S.C. 2012) (holding that as long as the minor
child’s mother had a good faith and objectively reasonable basis for believing that the
recording of her child’s telephone conversation with the defendant, the child’s father, was
necessary and in the best interest of the child, the consent provision of the State Wiretap Act
(S.C. Code Ann. § 17-30-30(C)) applied to and encompassed the “vicarious consent”
doctrine such that the mother could vicariously consent on behalf of the child to the
recording).
188. Other ostensibly applicable exceptions will likely be insufficient to excuse the
collection and use of surreptitious recordings by always-on device makers, such as the
“ordinary course of business” exception. The exception only applies to the statute’s
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For both states that clearly require all-party consent and the states that
hinge consent from all parties on a reasonable expectation of privacy,
passive listening by always-on devices is unlikely to meet those standards.
The possibility that always-on devices are violating those laws thus has
considerable implications for individual privacy, for the companies selling
those devices, and for privacy law and policy. If device users typically
aren’t getting consent to record the people around them and companies are
collecting, using, or disclosing those recordings, that should create liability
for the company. Both the state and federal wiretap statutes are enforceable
by government prosecutors and individuals, which means that the practical
implications of violations are ideally more meaningful than a hypothetically
applicable law that regulators don’t have the time or wherewithal to
definition of “telephone equipment” (which always-on devices wouldn’t be), and the
conduct must be within the user’s ordinary course of business, as well as “instrumental” to
the provision of the actual service. Courts have confirmed the narrowness of the exception
when companies have previously attempted this argument in online tracking cases, holding
that the kinds of interceptions permitted by the exception must actually facilitate the
communications service, not simply render it more lucrative, and that accepting the
companies’ interpretation would contradict the meaning of the statute and congressional
intent in enacting it. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL
5423918, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013), motion to certify appeal denied, 2014 WL
294441, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) (“[T]he statutory scheme suggests that Congress did
not intend to allow electronic communication service providers unlimited leeway to engage
in any interception that would benefit their business models, as Google contends.”); id. at
*8–11 (finding that for the exception to apply, there must be “some nexus between the need
to engage in the alleged interception and the subscriber’s ultimate business, that is, the
ability to provide the underlying service or good”); Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (“The
court rejects the suggestion that any activity that generates revenue for a company should be
considered within the ‘ordinary course of its business.’”). Making advertising more granular
and the company’s data sets even more valuable is not necessary to provide a voice assistant
service; it is simply conducive to its further monetization.
The exception also only applies to wire and electronic communications, not oral
communications—which makes sense, considering that the Wiretap Act’s authors in the
1960s and its amenders in the 1980s did not contemplate eavesdropping-as-a-service for
which an “ordinary course of business” exception would be remotely relevant. The use of
phones (wire communications) and email (electronic communications) involves
intermediaries with legitimate service quality prerogatives, whose carefully limited ability to
monitor the efficacy of their services addresses the needs of consumers, as well as the needs
or preferences of the service providers. Oral conversations conducted with an expectation of
privacy and nevertheless recorded by a mechanical device would have appeared at the time
to lack the same infrastructural component and corresponding need. The exception is
extremely narrow, and simply does not apply to the collection and use of audio recordings
without consent to make data collection even more profitable.
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enforce. 189 The damages available to plaintiffs also make violations an
impactful consideration. The legal status quo is tenuous and points to larger
problems in privacy law and policy that will continue to be created by
always-on devices, and which are not limited to wiretapping laws.
B. State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws
The failure of device companies and device owners to obtain consent
from everyone being recorded has similarly significant implications for
consumer protection laws, including COPPA and state and federal
unfairness and deceptive practice statutes. Recording third parties without
their consent, while representing that the devices only record when the
wake word is uttered, is exactly the kind of practice that the FTC has
previously found to be material in unfairness and deception cases. 190
Representations by tech companies that their devices only record
conversations upon the utterance of a specific command are misleading, as
are omissions of specific, clear, and unambiguous disclosures that the
recordings might occur at other times and will be used by the company for a
range of purposes other than fulfilling the device owner’s command, such
as advertising. There are minor distinctions from product to product in
terms of the privacy representations the companies make—as discussed in
Part II, some of the bigger companies that were criticized for their
undisclosed use of human contractors to transcribe recordings have made a
range of product changes, both cosmetic and substantive. But the space
between “our device only records you when you say the wake word and we
care deeply about your privacy” and “our device will often record you, as
well as people who haven’t consented to being recorded, and our company
will use those recordings for whatever we want” is, broadly speaking, a
material misrepresentation for the companies still making the former
claim. 191 Consumers acting reasonably would assume that the company is

189. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional
Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 535 (2017) (describing the track records of private
litigation in vindicating privacy harms as “stunningly poor” as the result of “denial of
standing, enforcement of boilerplate waivers, denial of class certification, disposal via
opaque multidistrict litigation proceedings, and cy pres settlements”).
190. See supra Section III.B.
191. See generally Letter from James C. Miller, Chairman, to Hon. John Dingell,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Com., H.R., (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf (“A ‘material’
misrepresentation or practice is one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or
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not lying to them when it claims to only record them and the people around
them when they say the wake word. The acquisition and/or use of
surreptitious recordings is unequivocally material, as it would change
people’s willingness to purchase the product.
The collection and use of surreptitious recordings might also constitute
an unfair trade practice under the FTC Act or state unfair and deceptive acts
and practices statutes. An unfair trade practice is one that causes or is likely
to cause significant injury to consumers and is not reasonably avoidable by
them, with no countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 192 The
authority rests on the inherent danger of the practice itself, rather than the
company’s characterizations of it, and establishes a higher bar for the
regulator to justify the intervention, as they are required to show a finding
of injury that deception does not require. The FTC has frequently relied on
deception arguments in privacy cases, but it has made unfairness claims in a
number of cases that involve data security practices that violate people’s
privacy, such as a dating website that failed to take reasonable steps to
secure users’ information, like robust protocols to access a corporate virtual
private network, 193 and a smart TV company that conducted pervasive and
invasive tracking on everything people watched through a setting that was
nearly impossible to locate and disable. 194 Having all kinds of sensitive
information recorded and used without one’s knowledge is a substantial
injury, and given that always-on devices don’t make clear when they’re
recording (or may not be visible to the people being recorded), the injury is
not reasonably avoidable.
In addition to state and federal wiretap laws and unfair and deceptive
practices, many always-on devices are likely violating COPPA. Voice
recordings are personal information subject to the statute, and unless
companies are discarding every recording in which a child’s voice is
included (or using it to complete a direct request from the child, and then
conduct regarding a product. In other words, it is information that is important to
consumers.”).
192. Letter from Michael Pertschuk et al., Chairman, FTC Commissioners to Hon.
Wendell H. Ford, Senator, & Hon. John C. Danforth, Senator (Dec. 17, 1980),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness.
193. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 9–10, FTC v.
Ruby Corp., No. 1:16-cv-02438 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/161214ashleymadisoncmplt1.pdf.
194. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable and Monetary Relief at 8–
9, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017.02.06_complaint.pdf.
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discarding it), operators are required to obtain verifiable parental consent
from the parents or guardians of every child whose voice recording they’re
collecting and failing to delete—which they are almost certainly not
doing. 195 A legally acceptable method of verifiable parental consent must be
reasonably calculated to ascertain that the consent obtained is from the
child’s parent or guardian, such as by requiring a small credit card charge
refunded to the parent when a child’s user account is created.196
The vast majority of companies collecting this information will almost
certainly claim that COPPA does not apply to their service, which is a
tenuous claim at best. Most always-on device companies will argue that
their services are for audiences of all ages, rather than targeted to children
(frequently true), and that they do not have the actual knowledge of
collecting children’s personal information that the statute requires for
general audience services. But these companies are labeling and
transcribing recordings and will often be able to infer that the speaker is a
child. And the objective of these transcriptions, after all, includes
identifying various attributes of the speakers from the recordings. It is
simply implausible that companies whose business models rely on
pervasive and granular data collection are unaware that a child is in the
household, particularly when information about children in a household is a
primary indicator of purchasing behavior—key for the advertisers these
companies make their money from. Other companies offer specifically
child-directed voice services, like the Echo Dot Kids’ Edition. 197 COPPA
governs companies’ collection of private information, such as voice
recordings, from children under thirteen in either situation.
While some of these companies could be obtaining verifiable parental
consent when the adult who bought the device is the guardian of the child
being recorded, they do not appear to be obtaining it for any other children
that the device records. If Child A has a playdate at the home of Child B,
Parent B may have given verifiable parental consent for any recordings of
195. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding the
Applicability of the COPPA Rule to the Collection and Use of Voice Recordings (Oct. 20,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1266473/coppa_
policy_statement_audiorecordings.pdf.
196. Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions: Verifiable Parental Consent,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complyingcoppa-frequently-asked-questions-0#I.%20Verifiable%20Parental%20Consent (last visited
Feb. 2, 2021).
197. See CAMPAIGN FOR A COMMERCIAL-FREE CHILDHOOD ET AL., supra note 96.
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Child B, but cannot provide (and likely did not contemplate providing)
verifiable consent for Child A. If common sense and the “Wiretapping Your
Friends” study are any indication, the likelihood that parents are even
attempting to obtain consent in this way—or feel an obligation to do so—is
slim at best. The collection, use, or disclosure of recordings under such
circumstances violates COPPA.198 The statute does not include a private
right of action, but it is enforceable by both the FTC and state attorneys
general, all of whom have their work cut out for them.
VI. Broader Policy Implications
This Article has illustrated how surreptitious, accidental recordings by
always-on devices are likely violating state and federal wiretap and
consumer protection laws. The possibility that regulators could bring
enforcement actions, or that individual plaintiffs could bring suit based on
those violations, has very real implications for the companies selling those
devices as the law currently stands. But those implications rest on a key
assumption: that the regulators in charge of enforcing those laws have the
resources and political will to enforce them. Private rights of action under
state and federal wiretap laws may present a more meaningful deterrent to
companies, but COPPA and unfair and deceptive acts and practices statutes
rely on the FTC and the state attorneys general for their penalties to mean
anything at all. Tech companies have rampantly violated U.S. privacy laws
with impunity, in part due to their lack of enforcement, and will have no
reason not to continue doing so unless regulators give them a reason to
stop.199 They must do so, and the elected officials those regulators answer
to must ensure their capacity to change corporate incentives by funding
enforcement agencies like the FTC and state attorney general offices,
demanding more vigorous enforcement efforts,200 and supporting regulators
when those efforts are the subject of disingenuous attacks. 201
198. See id.
199. See generally Waldman, supra note 84, at 774–75 (describing how privacy law is
failing to constrain privacy violations, in part due to the hollowing out of public enforcement
mechanisms).
200. The Technology 202: The Government’s Top Silicon Valley Watchdog Only Has
Five Full-time Technologists. Now It’s Asking Congress for More, WASH. POST (Apr. 4,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/
04/04/the-technology-202-the-government-s-top-silicon-valley-watchdog-only-has-five-fulltime-technologists-now-it-s-asking-congress-for-more/5ca512661b326b0f7f38f30d/
(describing the FTC Chairman’s request to the House Energy and Commerce Committee for
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Even for cases where the legal theories under relevant wiretap statutes
are strong, private plaintiffs will face an uphill battle, given the chasm
between the right to sue a company for illegal conduct and the practical
ability to do so. Decades of judicial hostility to privacy litigants 202 and the
widespread use of forced arbitration clauses will be substantial obstacles, as
though finding the time and resources to vindicate violated rights through
litigation weren’t difficult enough for most people already. That doesn’t
mean that plaintiffs’ firms and advocacy groups shouldn’t try, particularly
given the ripple effects that individual cases can have for companies
attempting to anticipate and mitigate future liability concerns. But litigation
alone cannot solve this problem or the broader systemic problems of
corporate surveillance that surreptitious listening devices exemplify.
Proactive and structural changes that limit invasive corporate practices are
needed.
Those changes must focus on the exploitative practices of corporations,
not the wishful fantasy that a better set of privacy controls for individual
users can correct the power imbalance between powerful companies and the
people they surveil. The fact that always-on devices often record people in
the background without their consent, and that many companies are likely
using these recordings to build ever more granular profiles of the people
they record, is just one more example on a very long list illustrating the
futility of consent-based approaches. 203 A consent regime that coalesced
with the reality of always-on devices would depend on social practices that
do not currently exist and which would never be a reliable or consistent
safeguard: parents requiring other parents to read a privacy policy and give
their consent to the device company before a playdate, dinner party hosts
doing the same for their guests, and so forth. The flaws of human decisionmaking compel an approach that primarily focuses on regulating
corporations, not individuals. Policymakers asking judges for injunctive
relief or drafting new privacy laws must resist the pretense that privacy selfmore money and staff, given that the agency has only forty full-time staff focused on privacy
and five full-time technologists, as opposed to the UK’s counterpart agency’s five-hundredperson staff or Ireland’s 110, countries with much smaller jurisdictions).
201. See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett et al., Illusory Conflicts: Post-Employment Clearance
Procedures and the FTC’s Technological Expertise, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 816
(2021) (describing such attacks and citing Luke Herrine’s additional history of them); Luke
Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431, 467, 506–09 (2021).
202. Cohen, supra note 189; Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 361, 361–63 (2014).
203. See generally Solove, supra note 6.
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management (and indeed, privacy bystander management) is an effective
governance scheme and instead focus on corporate use limitations and
prohibitions, retention limitations, deletion requirements, and changes that
make those protections expensive and risky to ignore, as well as
strengthening regulatory capacity to conduct vigorous oversight and
enforcement.
In addition, the effect of resignation on privacy expectations reported by
study participants illustrates why privacy expectations should not be the
sole dictate of legal protections for people’s privacy. Resignation to privacy
violations and learned helplessness make an expectation-based standard a
race to the bottom, 204 and the unpredictability of those expectations and
preferences makes coherent application difficult. Privacy laws and
regulations should be designed to reorient the structural incentives of
companies away from collecting first and asking questions later, rather than
relying on the reactions of people who’ve understandably grown
accustomed to having their privacy invaded. Any expectation-based
standard to determine the degree of protections people will receive for their
privacy must account for the effects of resignation and lack of meaningful
choice. Regulators and courts applying expectation-based standards must
address how resignation and lack of choice molds those expectations, and
those that don’t will further entrench an exploitative feedback loop that
favors corporate profit incentives over the imperative of protecting
individual rights. Future privacy laws should learn from the mistakes of
current ones and avoid making privacy expectations determinative of
privacy protections.
VII. Conclusion
Always-on devices are just one example of a larger paradigm in
technology policy. They’re often cheap and tremendously popular; they’re
sold by powerful companies with the means and motivation to broaden their
already substantial market power by making these devices ubiquitous; they
violate people’s privacy on a massive scale that regulators have, so far,
failed to meaningfully constrain; and they illustrate the fundamental failure
of consent as a primary privacy safeguard, and the severe limits of tying
privacy protections to resignation-skewed expectations.
204. Nora A. Draper & Joseph Turow, The Corporate Cultivation of Digital Resignation,
21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1824 (2019); Solove, supra note 112, at 5 (“Resignation is a
rational response to the impossibility of privacy self-management.”).
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But as the genesis of wiretapping laws illustrates, both real people and
the laws designed to protect their privacy have long treated surreptitious
recordings as an unusually severe invasion. The right advocacy strategy and
public awareness campaign could enable always-on devices to serve as the
example of why meaningful sector-wide privacy reforms that
fundamentally remold corporate incentives are so badly needed. At the very
least, one might hope that an enterprising state attorney general or the FTC
might take notice of the companies violating an array of privacy laws by
surreptitiously listening to their customers and decide to do something
about it.
The “Wiretapping Your Friends” study illustrates the need to
acknowledge privacy as a broader, collective social problem. Privacy
decisions aren’t made in a vacuum, and they have collective consequences
that a focus on individual decision-making often ignores. 205 A privacy
governance model that relies exclusively on individual decision-making
will always provide inadequate protections, and a model that hinges privacy
protections on the decisions of every smartphone owner we come into
contact with is even weaker still. The focus of new privacy laws and
regulations must be on reversing corporate incentives to violate individual
privacy, rather than continuing to rely on a paradigm that those companies
hope to preserve because of how dangerously permissive it is.

205. See generally Emre Sarigol et al., Online Privacy as a Collective Phenomenon, in
ACM, COSN’14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 ACM CONFERENCE ON ONLINE SOCIAL
NETWORKS 95 (2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.6197.pdf; Bernadette Kamleitner & Vince
Mitchell, Your Data Is My Data: A Framework for Addressing Interdependent Privacy
Infringements, 38 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 433, 433 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/0743915619858924; Barocas & Levy, supra note 7.
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